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Towards a Supranational Identity?
The Implications of a Single
European Currency
This time, Western Europeans have not lacked
boldness or acted too late. The memory of their
misfortunes seems to have inspired them and
given them the courage necessary to forget old
enmities and sweep aside time-worn traditions of
yesteryear, thus enabling them to think and act in
a truly new way and to carry through the greatest
planned transformation in the history of Europe.
-Paul-Henri Spaak
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Over forty years ago, Paul-Henri Spaak, widely considered to have
been one of the original architects of "Europe," used these words to
applaud the signing of the 1957 Treaty of Rome' that established the
European Economic Community (EEC).2 Today, as Europe enters the
reality of a single currency, the euro, Spaak's words seem strangely
appropriate, if not prophetic. Indeed, the commencement of the third
and final stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) process3
arguably completes the "greatest planned transformation in the history
of Europe."
With the commencement of stage three on January 1, 1999, the
euro became the official monetary unit of eleven Member States of the
European Union (EU).4 The euro is governed by a single monetary pol-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 5, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty is commonly referred to as the "Treaty of Rome."
2. The European Economic Community, or EEC, is one of three Communities that were
formed during the 1950s. The objectives of the EEC are set forth in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty:
"It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its
Member States." Id. at Art. 2.
3. The Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty,
established a framework and timetable for attaining full Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. For a
detailed discussion of the three stages of the EMU process, see infra Part II.
4. The EU came into being after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty on November
1, 1993. The fifteen Member States of the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. With the exception of Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the
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icy set forth and implemented by the newly established European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB). Although actual euro notes and coins will not be
introduced until January 1, 2002, the currencies of the eleven Member
States are no longer independent, but only denominations of the euro at
a conversion rate which became irrevocably fixed at the start of stage
three.
Although the advent of the euro has been widely discussed, only
limited attention has been devoted to the social and psychological
implications of a single European currency. The following comment will
explore the euro's potential for reshaping national identity and facilitat-
ing the emergence of a European, or supranational, identity among
nationals of Member States of the EU.5 In doing so, the legal and practi-
cal effects of stage three of the EMU process will be considered.
This comment is divided into seven parts. Part I examines the
importance of a European identity in the context of European integra-
tion,6 and highlights the euro's potential for shaping such an identity.
Part II discusses the origins of European integration, particularly those
of economic integration, in order to shed light on the historical and polit-
ical significance of the euro. Part III outlines the legal and practical
effects of stage three of the EMU process, thereby illustrating the scope
of these changes. Part IV discusses the EU's strategies for disseminat-
ing information about the euro changeover. This discussion lays the
foundation for Part V, which analyzes the political rhetoric and symbol-
ism embedded in the EU's information campaign. An analysis of this
rhetoric and symbolism sheds light on the potential social and psycho-
logical implications of the euro. Part VI examines currency attitudes
and opinions concerning the single currency among EU citizens in gen-
eral, as well as among nationals of the Member States. This survey pro-
vides a helpful gauge of the current perceptions with regard to EMU and
eleven remaining Member States entered stage three of the EMU process. Greece and Sweden
were unable to meet the convergence criteria outlined by the Maastricht Treaty, while Denmark
and the United Kingdom exercised their right of opting out of participation in stage three. For a
discussion of the so-called convergence criteria, see infra note 45 and Part II.
5. This study is considerably limited for several reasons. First, there is a shortage of reliable
empirical data on the social and psychological effects of the euro. This shortage is partially due to
the fact that actual euro notes and coins have yet to be introduced. However, it is not certain
whether future studies will be able to accurately quantify these effects. Second, this study partly
relies on statements of national leaders and government officials, and information distributed by
the EU, which may be biased depending on the particular agenda being advanced. Nonetheless,
these sources are informing the mindset of many Europeans and, therefore, help shed light on the
possible social and psychological effects of the euro. For these reasons, this comment is limited to
exploring the euro's potential for reshaping national identity and fostering a European identity
among citizens of the EU.
6. It should be noted that a supranational identity has relevance not only for Europe, but for
other regions of the world that are attempting to integrate.
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the introduction of the euro. Finally, Part VII discusses various factors
that may mitigate the social and psychological impact of the changeover
to a single currency.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY
The architects of "Europe" have long recognized the importance, as
well as the deficiency, of a European identity. Since the 1970s, the
European Council7 has identified the need for strengthening a European
identity and enhancing a sense of belonging to Europe among nationals
of the Member States.8 During the mid-1980s, this identity and this
sense of belonging were promoted through "consciousness-raising"
campaigns that included newly created "Euro-symbols," such as the
European passport,9 the European anthem and the European flag.' °
More recently, the Maastricht Treaty reaffirmed the importance of
fostering a European identity. Of the goals outlined in the Treaty," the
aim of "creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" is
perhaps the most fundamental of these objectives. 2 From a legal stand-
7. The European Council now consists of the heads of government of the Member States of
the EU. The European Council meets semi-annually to frame EU policy and direct
intergovernmental cooperation. The European Council is distinct from the Council of Ministers,
commonly referred to as the Council, which is composed of the ministers from the various policy
areas from each of the Member State governments. The function of the Council is to adopt
legislation initially proposed by the European Commission, the body that is responsible for
proposing and implementing the laws governing the EU.
8. See Cris Shore and Annabel Black, Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European
Identity, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF EUROPE, 275, 285 (Victoria A. Goddard et al. eds., 1994).
9. It should be noted that European passports are issued by the Member States and indicate
that the holder is both a national of the Member State and a citizen of the EU.
10. See Shore and Black, supra note 8, at 286.
11. The Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty resolved to accomplish the following objectives:
"[T]o deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and
their traditions; to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so
as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to
them; to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an
economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single
and stable currency; to promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into
account the principle of sustainable development and within the context of the accomplishment of
the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement
policies ensuring that advances in economic integration are accompanied by parallel progress in
other fields; to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their countries; to implement a
common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy,
which might in time lead to a common defense policy, thereby reinforcing the European identity
and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world;
their objective to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of
their peoples, by including provisions on justice and home affairs in this Treaty; to continue the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are
taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity."
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, at 253 (emphasis added).
12. See Shore and Black, supra note 8, at 275.
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point, much has been accomplished to fulfill this objective. When the
Maastricht Treaty entered into force on November 1, 1993, the nationals
of the Member States automatically became citizens of the European
Union, 3 thereby acquiring an array of unprecedented rights and duties.14
Although the nature and scope of citizenship has been evolving through-
out history, traditional notions of citizenship usually imply a common
identity. Hence, the newly-created European citizenship suggests the
possibility of a European, or supranational, identity. Yet, despite the
creation of Euro-symbols and European citizenship, a sense of a com-
mon European identity is conspicuously absent among nationals of the
Member States. Indeed, most European citizens identify and define
themselves almost exclusively in terms of their own nationality. 5
Although such creations as the European flag and anthem suggest unity,
they are little more than symbols that lie in the periphery of everyday
experience.' 6 Furthermore, the benefits of European citizenship are
inherently intangible and, for many, virtually meaningless. Outside of
these limited efforts, there has so far been very little basis for unity and a
shared sense of identity.' 7
However, this trend will likely change as eleven Member States are
poised to shed their national currencies in favor of the euro. As one
commentator noted, "Replacement of national currency and coins by the
euro will represent a far more meaningful symbol of Union integration
than the current European passport or Union flag will ever be."' 8 As
this comment suggests, the psychological effects of losing one of the
13. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, at Art. B.
14. As specified by Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty, Union citizenship confers the
following rights: To move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (8a); to vote
and stand as a candidate in municipal elections and elections to the European Parliament in the
Member State in which he [or she] resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State
(8b); to be protected in certain non-Member States by the diplomatic or consular missions of any
Member State under the same conditions as nationals of that State (8c); to petition the European
Parliament and apply to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (8d). See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3,
at 259.
15. See Barbara George ET AL., The Dilemma of the European Union: Balancing the Power
of the Supranational EU Entity Against the Sovereignty of its Independent Member Nations, 9
Pace Int'l L. Rev. 111, 124 (1997).
16. Id.
17. As one author noted, "[The lack of a European identity] results from the fact that there
have been no crucial European defining moments which would serve to engage ordinary people;
no wars or charismatic heroes to inspire the kind of supranational patriotism or loyalty that can
bind diverse peoples together." Id. But see Vaclav Havel, Speech made to the European
Parliament on March 8, 1994 <http://www.eurplace.org/diba/citta/havel.html> (asserting that the
European Union is ". . .based on a large set of values, with roots in antiquity and in Christianity
which over 2,000 years evolved into what we recognize today as the foundations of modem
democracy, the rule of law and civil society.").
18. Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 254 (1998).
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most potent symbols of one's national identity will be profound. Indeed,
"Money goes to the heart of people's lives. It is their retirement, their
security, their children's education, their hopes and fears."' 9 Thus, the
psychological implications of the euro will be inescapable as most indi-
viduals will have no choice but to confront the reality of a single cur-
rency on a daily basis. As the Economic and Social Committee2"
explained:
The man in the street identifies his national currency with his coun-
try, even if he does not realize the term "currency" covers a number
of concepts: "cash"; "means of payment and trade" and "currency
reserves". The public does however realize, at least intuitively, that
the right to issue currency is one of the attributes of an independent
state, particularly since the very name of a state's currency is gener-
ally closely linked to the history of the state. Assenting to the intro-
duction of the single currency is therefore regarded as assenting to a
partial loss of identity and a surrender of sovereignty, which is offset
by the fact that such a step constitutes a significant and conscious
contribution towards the building of Europe.2'
Although these observations are politically biased, they nonetheless
highlight the anticipated psychological effects of a single currency. The
introduction of the euro-the ultimate Euro-symbol-likely will initiate
the most effective "consciousness-raising" campaign of the European
integration process. As Wim Duisenberg, the President of the ECB,
declared at the start of stage three, "A currency is part of the identity of a
people. It reflects what they have in common, now and in the future.
May the euro become a unifying symbol for the people of Europe. ' 2
These words underscore the euro's potential for fostering a suprana-
tional identity and a sense of belonging to Europe.
The importance of fostering a European identity cannot be over-
stated. Indeed, the lack of European unity and identity may be one of
the greatest obstacles to sustainable integration.23 As Vaclav Havel
19. Barry James, Media Blitz to Woo a Skeptical Public, INT'L HERALD TRn. (May 5, 1998)
<http://www.iht.com/IHT/BJ/98/bj050298c.html>.
20. The Economic and Social Committee is composed of members of the business
community and labor organizations, as well as consumer representatives. The Economic and
Social Committee submits opinions to the Commission with regard to proposed legislation and
must be consulted before decisions are made on a number of issues.
21. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Green Paper on the Practical
Arrangement for the Introduction of the Single Currency, CES 1174/95 (Oct. 26, 1995) <http://
europa.eu.int/euro/html/page... tmldossier=52&lang=5&page=25&nav=5> [hereinafter Opinion
of the Economic and Social Committee].
22. Jeffrey Ulbrich, Hello, Euro: Will One Currency Lead to a More Unified Europe?, ABC
NEWS.COM. (Jan. 1, 1999) <http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/DailyNews/
euro990101 europe.html>).
23. See George, supra note 15, at 124.
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acknowledged:
[T]he most important task facing the European Union today is com-
ing up with a new and genuinely clear reflection on what might be
called European identity... Simply reading the Maastricht Treaty,
despite its historical importance, will hardly win enthusiastic support-
ers for the European Union. Nor will it win patriots, people who will
genuinely experience this complex organism as their native land or
their home, or as one aspect of their home. If this great administra-
tive work, which obviously should simplify life for all Europeans, is
to hold together and stand various tests of time, then it must be visi-
bly bonded by more than a set of rules and regulations[.]2 4
In light of this observation, the euro is integral to the viability of the
integration process since the euro should serve as a highly visible monu-
ment and reminder of European integration. A brief discussion of the
origins of European integration will further shed light on the historical
and political significance of the euro.
II. ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EMU
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was utterly devastated.
Economies and infrastructures had to be rebuilt for the second time in
less than thirty years. The emotional and psychological wounds of
World War I had been reopened and were in need of healing. The les-
sons of (hyper)nationalism and rivalry were painfully clear. Against this
backdrop, European nations began the task of reconstructing a new
Europe, both literally and figuratively.
During the 1950s, three Communities, the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC),25 the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) 26 and the European Economic Community (EEC), 7 were
established. By joining the Communities, the Member States surren-
dered certain aspects of their sovereignty to a higher, supranational
authority. Of the three Communities, the EEC has been the most influ-
ential and far-reaching by far.28 Although the EEC Treaty did not
24. Havel, supra note 17.
25. The ECSC, the first step toward European integration, was the brainchild of Robert
Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, who, in 1950, proposed the pooling of the European coal
and steel industries under a common authority. It should be noted that these industries had
traditionally been the basis for each country's military arsenal. Subsequent to Schuman's
proposal, the treaty establishing the ECSC was signed by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and West Germany (the "Six") on April 18, 1951, and entered into force in 1952. See
George, supra note 15 at 128-29.
26. Euratom was created alongside the EEC on March 25, 1957, in order to pool atomic
energy resources of the six countries that belonged to the ECSC. The treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community entered into force in 1958.
27. See supra note 2.
28. Although the EEC Treaty primarily called for the elimination of all trade barriers between
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explicitly mention the creation of a common currency, the Treaty initi-
ated a process of economic integration which would eventually
culminate in full EMU and the introduction of a single currency. As one
commentator noted: "[I]f one wishes to go all the way in abolishing
customs duties and quotas, i.e., in the commercial aspects of economic
cooperation, one's actions cannot be limited to customs duties and quo-
tas."29 Indeed, the EEC Treaty started the process toward not only eco-
nomic integration, but political integration as well. As Walter Hallstein,
the first President of the Commission, stressed, "[W]e are not integrating
economies, we are integrating politics."30
Until the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates, 3' the EEC had not yet attained much importance. Dur-
ing the economic volatility of the late 1960s and early 1970s, however,
the EEC assumed an important role in stabilizing the economies of
Member States.32 In 1970, the Werner Report33 reaffirmed the goal of
attaining full EMU. The Report, which outlined a three-stage plan for
attaining EMU, was generally endorsed by the Member States. The eco-
nomic pressures caused by the energy crisis of the mid-1970s, however,
prevented meaningful cooperation and thereby postponed the goal of
EMU.34
The success of the Economic and Monetary System (EMS) 35 and
the internal market program during the 1980s renewed interest in attain-
ing EMU. In June 1988, the European Council, under the leadership of
Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Mitterand of France, "con-
Member States, Article 3 of the treaty outlined other significant Community activities ranging
from agricultural policy to the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, services,
persons and capital between Member States. See EEC Treaty supra note 1, at Art. 3.
29. Jean Deniau, The Objectives and Constitutional Structure of the European Economic
Community, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE EEC AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 1,
4-5 (1961).
30. DEREK URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINCE 1945, at 76 (2d ed. 1995).
31. For a detailed discussion of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, see
JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:
SELECTED ESSAYS VOL. II 74-136 (1984).
32. Pursuant to Article 105 of the EEC Treaty, the EEC took initial steps to coordinate
economic and monetary policy in order to stabilize the economies of Member States. See Goebel,
supra note 18, at 256.
33. The Werner Report, named after the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who chaired a
committee of experts studying economic and monetary coordination, was presented to the Council
of Ministers in October 1970. See id. at 257.
34. Id. at 257-258.
35. The EMS came into force in March 1979 pursuant to the European Council Meeting at
Bremen in July 1978. The EMS was created in order to achieve monetary stability and to provide
a framework for better cooperation and coordination in the sphere of economic policy. For a
detailed discussion of the EMS, see Goebel, supra note 18, at 258.
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firmed the objective of progressive realization of economic and mone-
tary union. ' ' 36 Together they created a special committee to study and
propose measures for attaining this objective. The special committee,
headed by Commission President Jacques Delors, was comprised of
bank specialists and central bank governors of the Member States. It
produced the 1989 Delors Report, which proposed a three stage process
for attaining EMU. In December 1989, the European Council approved
the central themes of the Delors Report and, after intense debate, voted37
to call an intergovernmental conference for the purpose establishing an
EMU. 3' The Rome Intergovernmental Conference began on December
15, 1990 and, after a year, produced the text of the Treaty on European
Union, which incorporated the Delors Report's three stages for creating
EMU.
Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty did not come easily as several
Member States vehemently opposed the ramifications of full EMU.
However, certain key compromises, such as granting the United King-
dom and Denmark the right to opt out of the third stage of EMU, were
reached, and the Maastricht Treaty was ratified.
Although the Maastricht Treaty addresses a number of areas, rang-
ing from Common Foreign and Security Policy to Coordination in Jus-
tice and Home Affairs, the EMU provisions are at the heart of the
Treaty. Indeed, Article B of the Maastricht Treaty emphasizes that
EMU and the creation of a single currency are among the principle
objectives of the European Union.39 Furthermore, the provisions on
EMU, by virtue of being enshrined in the TEU, gain treaty, or quasi-
constitutional, force and therefore may be enforced and reviewed by the
Court of Justice.40
The first stage toward attaining full EMU began on July 1, 1990
(before the conception of the Maastricht Treaty) and contained three
components: (1) free movement of capital, a necessary precondition to
EMU;41 (2) adherence of all Member States to the EMS4 2 and the
Exchange Rate Mechanism; and (3) a heightened level of monetary
36. Id. at 264 (quoting Bull. EC 6-1988, at 165).
37. The European Council voted II to 1, over the opposition of the United Kingdom, to call
the intergovernmental conference. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 265.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 271.
40. The European Court of Justice sits in Luxembourg and is the final arbiter of questions
pertaining to the various treaties among Member States of the EU. The European Court of Justice
hears cases dealing with rights and obligations arising from such treaties that are brought before it
by Member States, institutions of the EU, as well as private entities and citizens.
41. A 1988 Directive (88/361) mandated the removal of all government restrictions on the
free movement of capital no later than July 1, 1990. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 270.
42. See supra note 35.
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coordination among Member State governments and their central
banks.43 The second stage, which began on January 1, 1994 and ended
on December 31, 1998, had two key features: the establishment of the
European Monetary Institute (EMI)," and the obligation of Member
States to meet the so-called convergence criteria45 for participation in
the third stage of EMU. On May 2-3, 1998, pursuant to the Commis-
sion's proposals, the Council approved eleven Member States46 that had
met the convergence criteria for participation in stage three.47 It should
be noted that, in order to reduce inflation and government spending, the
Member States underwent significant and generally unpopular economic
hardship and sacrifice, which required a great deal of fiscal discipline
and political resolve.
The third and final stage of the EMU process began on January 1,
1999. The third stage has three main components: 1) the establishment
43. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 273.
44. The EMI is a body formed for the purpose of a) coordinating policies and actions among
central banks, b) monitoring the EMS and c) preparing the way for the introduction of the single
currency.
45. Member State participation in stage three of the EMU process is contingent on meeting
the convergence criteria set forth by the Maastricht Treaty. The criteria was designed to ensure
economic conditions favorable for a strong and stable European currency. The convergence
criteria are: 1) Inflation rates, observed over a period of one year, must not be more than 1.5%
above the average of the three best performing Member States; 2) Long-term interest rates
observed over a period of one year must not be above 2% of the average of the three best Member
States in terms of price stability; 3) Member States' budget deficits (including central, regional
and local government) should not exceed 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unless they
are temporary or exceptional; 4) Public debt ratio of Member States should not exceed 60% of
GDP; 5) Member State currencies must have respected the normal fluctuation margins provided
by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS without severe tensions or unilateral devaluations
for at least the last two years; and 6) Central banks of member states must be granted full
independence. See Euro Page: Moving Toward the Euro: (visited April 20, 1999) <http://
freeusers.digibel.be/-gedesmet/euro/euroverg.htm>. For a more detailed discussion of the
convergence criteria, see Goebel, supra note 18, at 303.
46. The eleven Member States that were approved for participation in stage three are: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. Sweden and Greece, though unable to meet the convergence criteria as of the May 1998
Council Meeting, will have the opportunity to enter the third stage of the EMU process once they
meet the criteria. At that time, the United Kingdom and Denmark opted out of participating in
stage three (pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty).
47. In March 1998, the Commission applauded the Member States' efforts to meet the
convergence criteria:
The average rate of inflation in the Community has fallen substantially and is now
under the 2% mark in nearly all Member States. The average general government
deficit in the Community fell from 6.1% of GDP in 1993 to 2.4% in 1997, allowing
structural reduction in the government debt ratio. These achievements have enabled
long-term interest rates to fall sharply, thereby benefiting investment and growth,
and have strengthened exchange-rate stability within the EMS.
Commission Report on Progress Towards Convergence and Recommendation With a View to the
Transition to the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union (Mar. 25, 1999) <http://europa.eu.
int/comm/off/rep/conver/introen.htm> [hereinafter Commission Report on Progress].
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of the ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),4 8 for
the purpose of exercising the primary monetary powers of the EMU; 2)
the creation of a binding system for regulating the monetary policies of
the Member States in the EMU; and 3) the creation of a single currency
to replace national currencies as the sole legal tender for the Member
States in the EMU.4 9 A more thorough discussion of the effects of stage
three reveals the scope of the changes brought about by attaining full
EMU.
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF STAGE THREE
Although stage three is already underway, it will not culminate
until actual euro notes and coins are introduced on January 1, 2002, and
will not be fully implemented until the euro completely replaces national
currencies as the sole legal tender on July 1, 2002. Nonetheless, the
commencement of stage three already has resulted in profound legal and
practical changes.
The interim leading up to July 1, 2002, is meant to serve as a transi-
tional period, designed to ensure a smooth changeover from national
currencies to the euro. On January 1, 1999, the national currencies of the
eleven participating Member States ceased to be independent as the con-
version rate of each currency to the euro was irrevocably fixed pursuant
to Article 109 L of the Maastricht Treaty. Though national currencies
will remain in circulation and legal tender during the transitional period,
they will merely be subdivisions of the euro. As the 1995 Green Paper
of the European Commission noted, the euro "becomes a currency in its
own right, for which the national currencies are perfect substitutes, i.e.,
different denominations of the single currency. 5 °
Also on January 1, 1999, the euro became the unit of account of the
ESCB. As a result, the euro will be used for all budgetary and account-
ing purposes of the participating Member States, as well as for all inter-
state monetary transactions." Additionally, the ESCB, under the
guidance of the ECB, began to define and implement a single monetary
policy for the eleven participating Member States so as to "maintain
price stability."5"
It is important to note that pursuant to Article 107 of the Maastricht
48. The ESCB is composed of the ECB and the central banks of the participating Member
States.
49. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 274.
50. Green Paper of the European Commission on the Practical Arrangements for the
Introduction of the Single Currency, COM (95) 333 final at 18, quoted in id. at 314.
51. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 314.
52. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 3, at Art. 105 (declaring that the primary objective of the
ESCB shall be to maintain price stability).
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Treaty, the ESCB will have total independence in its decision-making.53
This Article represents a crucial policy decision because most central
banks were not independent of their respective governments at the time
the Maastricht Treaty was ratified. It is not surprising, therefore, that
some Member States were reluctant to grant the ESCB total indepen-
dence. However, based on the success of the German and Dutch central
banks, both of which enjoyed independence from their governments, the
Member States agreed to grant full independence to the ESCB.54 Thus,
the ESCB is authorized to formulate a single monetary policy, no matter
how unpopular, without regard to political pressure from the participat-
ing Member States. This important feature of stage three of the EMU
process illustrates the extent to which participating Member States have
surrendered their sovereignty in order to reap the anticipated benefits of
EMU.
The euro became a reality in a number of other contexts. For
example, the start of stage three has transformed the debt and equities
markets of Europe. By January 4, 1999, all of the stock exchanges
within the euro-zone were prepared to quote, trade, and process securi-
ties in the single currency. Even the stock exchanges of Stockholm
and London, among the countries not participating in stage three, have
provided the option of quoting certain securities in euros.56 In response,
many stocks and bonds have been redenominated in euros.
On a different note, financial institutions are required to operate in
euros for their dealings with central banks, as well as on an inter-bank
level.5 Furthermore, businesses and commercial enterprises throughout
Europe are encouraged to use the euro for their internal accounting and
external transactions. For example, the ESCB has developed a system58
53. Article 107 states:
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon
them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national
central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a
Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and
the governments of Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to
seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the
national central banks in the performance of their task.
Id. at Art. 107.
54. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 278.
55. See INFEURO, no. 11, page 8 (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/
rubrique-defaut5.html?rubrique=101&lang=5>.
56. See id.
57. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 314.
58. See Target: Making Payments in Euros Easy. INFEURo, no. 1, 8 (visited Sept. 17, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/rubrique-defaut5.html?rubrique= 101 &lang=5> (discussing
TARGET, Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Tranfer, the EU-wide
system for euro payments).
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
whereby both internal and cross-border payments made by crediting an
account can be made either in euro or national currency units. In
accordance with the principal of "no prohibition, no compulsion" use of
the euro in this regard will be encouraged. Although businesses and
other enterprises will not be required to do so, a wide range of busi-
nesses, particularly large multinationals, already have taken steps to
incorporate the euro into their institutional framework. These steps
include accounting on a dual euro and national currency basis, floating
debt in euros, and invoicing and accepting payment in euros. 59 In addi-
tion, many businesses have adopted voluntary rules of conduct for incor-
porating the euro during the transitional period.6"
It is important to note that the advent of stage three poses potential
problems for the continuity of contracts and other legal instruments. As
a result, the Council has adopted certain measures "to reinforce legal
certainty and clarity."'" In particular, the Council adopted Regulation
1103/97, also known as the "continuity of contracts" regulation. One of
the key aims of Council Regulation 1103/97 is to provide assurance that
contracts will remain unaffected by the introduction of the euro.62 This
aim is provided for in Article 3 of the Regulation:
The introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any
term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance
under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to
alter or terminate such instrument. This provision is subject to any-
thing which the parties may have agreed.63
One commentator noted that this Regulation, which is binding on all EU
Member States, "is meant to bar completely any claim for rescission,
cancellation or non-performance under national law based on statutory
or case rules on frustration, impossibility, material alteration of terms,
inequity, and so forth."6 4 Regulation 1103/97 also expresses the hope
that third country jurisdictions will respect the principles of continuity
set forth. In accordance with this goal, the New York Legislature
enacted a statute65 which provides for the continuity of contracts denom-
59. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 314.
60. On June 30, 1998 representatives from the business sector and consumer groups, under
the auspices of the Commission, signed an agreement which established voluntary rules of
conduct for the years 1999 to 2001. For a discussion of these rules, see Consolidating
Confidence, INFEURO, no. 10, 6 (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/rubrique-
defaut5.html?rubrique=101 &lang=5>.
61. Goebel, supra note 18, at 317 (discussing Council Regulation 1103/97).
62. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 317.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See N.Y. SEssioN LAW § 5049A (McKinney 1997), amending N.Y. GEN. OBuLI. L §5-
1601.
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inated in national currency units. Other U.S. jurisdictions are also in the
process of adopting similar legislation.66
Although the commencement of stage three has profoundly affected
the governmental sector, as well as business and finance,67 its impact on
the general population has been limited. Nonetheless, certain legal and
practical consequences of stage three will have a direct practical impact
on the lives of ordinary citizens of participating Member States. For
example, citizens of Member States within the euro-zone will be able to
use the euro in all scriptural transactions, such as writing checks, using
credit and debit cards and even paying taxes.68 Consequently, money
transfers may be denominated in euro units. Furthermore, cash cards
and electronic billfolds, which are widely used throughout Europe,69
should be able to work anywhere in the euro-zone once they are denomi-
nated in euros.7° Although it is difficult to gauge the percentage of the
population that will use the euro in these scriptural and electronic trans-
actions, numerous other avenues will be opened for ordinary citizens to
become familiarized with the single currency during the transitional
period. For example, retailers and merchants are now pricing their
goods on a dual euro and national currency basis in order to familiarize
consumers with the value of the euro. In addition, most commercial
banks are servicing, their clients' deposit and loan accounts on a dual
currency basis.
Despite these opportunities to become acquainted with the euro, the
introduction of actual euro notes and coins will have the greatest psy-
chological impact on ordinary citizens, particularly when their national
currencies cease to be legal tender as of July 1, 2002. In order to cush-
ion the anticipated psychological impact of full EMU, the institutions of
the European Union are implementing various information strategies to
prepare the general public for the historic changeover.
66. See Goebel, supra note 18, at 317.
67. In order to carry out the preparations necessary for the changeover, the EU, national
governments and the private sector have spent and will continue to spend millions of euros (as of
September 14, 1999, 1 euro is equivalent to US$1.079). However, this one-time cost is expected
to be small in comparison to the long-term benefits of full EMU. For example, full EMU is
expected to greatly reduce foreign exchange costs and risk, as well as various other transaction
costs. In addition, the changeover is expected to create new financial opportunities and markets
and simplify trade, investing and accounting. See id. at 253.
68. Barry James, Adoption of Single Currency Marks Triumph of Political Will, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (May 2, 1998) <http://www.iht.com/IHT/BJ/98/bj050298>.
69. Today there are over 100 million cash cards and electronic billfolds in circulation in
Europe. However, these instruments, which are distinct from ATM cards, have so far been valid
only in the country of issue. See id.
70. See id.
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IV. INFORMATION STRATEGIES
The European Union has placed a high priority on providing its
citizens with information geared towards raising awareness and fostering
acceptance of the euro. The lessons of previous currency changeovers
within certain Member States have emphasized the importance and need
for an effective information campaign. For example, the introduction of
the French "Pinay franc" did not come into general use due to a poorly
devised information campaign.7 In recognition of such lessons, the
Commission regards the information campaign as "vital for the success"
of EMU.72
The Commission's Green Paper of May 31, 1995 outlined the prac-
tical arrangements for the single currency. The Paper identified two
broad objectives of the information campaign: 1) to stimulate and
encourage the preparations necessary in all sectors of the economy; and
2) to win the public's support for the single currency.73 Recently, the
'Commission refined the second objective to mean "preparing all citizens
to understand, accept and use the euro."74
However, to be successful, the information campaign must be
multi-dimensional. As the Commission recognized:
The introduction of the euro cannot be merely equated with the intro-
duction of a set of technical rules. To an extent which varies accord-
ing to the Member States or the individual, the currency is a vehicle
for values and ideals: preparation of the business community and the
general public for its introduction must deal with more than just the
practical arrangements.75
Indeed, the introduction of the euro represents far more than a practical
and logistical challenge. Therefore, aside from preparing Europeans for
the practical implications of the euro, the information campaign must
equally address the political and psychological aspects of the change-
over. The Economic and Social Committee similarly noted the impor-
tance of the psychological factors surrounding the changeover: "[I]t is
necessary to highlight the close relationship of the public with its cur-
rency and to understand the consequences of this, in order to ensure that
the change-over to a single currency takes place as smoothly as possi-
ble."76 These observations illustrate how the organs of the EU are
71. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 21, at page 27.
72. Commission Communication on the Information Strategy for the Euro, COM (1998) 39
(Euro Paper no. 16) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/page... tml?dossier=- 11 5&lang=5&page=2&
nav=5> [hereinafter Information Strategy].
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 21, at 29.
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keenly aware of the psychological hurdles that must be overcome during
the transitional period. Furthermore, the Commission's view that "the
currency is a vehicle for values and ideals" demonstrates an awareness
of the euro's potential to serve as a vehicle for promoting certain values
and ideals.77
Much of the responsibility for coordinating and implementing the
information campaign belongs to the Member States. The Commission
emphasized that, in accordance with the principal of subsidiarity,78
"Member States [must] play a pivotal role in the communication strategy
directed towards their citizens and businesses."79 This strategy is based
on the understanding that Member States are best-equipped to foster
awareness and support for the euro within their respective territories.
The Commission explained:
To be credible and effective, communication actions must be shaped
by the culture, language and concerns of the citizen. Information will
best be provided from sources that are close to the citizen and
regarded as both authoritative and reliable. This means focusing the
communications responsibility firmly on the Member States who
must not only create information tools and products, but also
encourage regional and local authorities, publicly owned utilities and
networks of civil organisations ... to act as vehicles and channels for
information on the euro. 80
Accordingly, the participating Member States will provide information
uniquely tailored to meet the distinct needs of their citizens. Supple-
menting these efforts, EU institutions, such as the Commission and the
Parliament, will continue to provide guidance and financial support to
the Member States.
In order to reach the broadest possible audience, information about
the euro will be disseminated in a variety of forms and through multiple
channels of communication during the transitional period. For example,
the Economic and Social Committee stressed the need to "harness all
information conduits," including "public administrative bodies and pri-
vate bodies such as associations, trade unions, distributive networks and
vocational organizations. '"81 Aside from these conduits, newspapers,
radio, television, and the Internet will be utilized. In addition, informa-
tion about the euro will have to be tailored for particular social groups
77. Information Strategy, supra note 72, at 5.
78. In short, the principle of subsidiarity mandates that the EU (and its institutions) should not
be given competencies, or powers, that can be better or more efficiently exercised by Member
States.
79. See Information Strategy supra note 72, at 21.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee supra note 21, at 29.
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and their assumed level of knowledge.82 This strategy, which requires
an accurate assessment of the needs of the various social groups,83
should help minimize feelings of marginalization with respect to the
changeover within a particular society.
It is important to note that children and young adults84 are a crucial
target of the information campaign. Consequently, the EU has imple-
mented a long-term, European-wide program for educating schoolchil-
dren about the euro. The expert group on "Euro-Education" reported to
the Commission:
[W]e are for the first time facing the need to teach Europe in each and
every school in the European Union. This is a wonderful opportunity
to implant the idea of European citizenship by placing the euro in
historical perspective, by bring out the symbolic nature of the euro as
a symbol of peace and economic prosperity, and by giving the euro a
civic dimension. There is no bypassing the education system as a
channel for information on the euro, given the complex practical
repercussions of the introduction of a single currency in everyday
life. There are various other advantages too, making this one of the
most fruitful ways of presenting information to the people of Europe.
The target public, i.e. young people of school age, is a population
which is very receptive, and which can perform a messenger function
in conveying the message to the home environment, among family
and friends. It is the active population of tomorrow's Europe.85
These observations show how the euro will be used as a vehicle for
educating Europeans about not only the changeover, but about the mean-
ing of Europe and European citizenship. The report also emphasizes
that young people are generally very receptive to new ideas and likely to
82. See id.
83. The Commission has identified several social groups that are in need of specialized
information. These groups include the poor and illiterate, the elderly and handicapped, and
women. Concerning women, the Commission noted:
Women are particularly affected in two respects. Like all working people, they will
have to cope with the effects of the introduction of the Euro in their working and
daily lives. But unlike the majority of their male colleagues and friends, they will
also have to get used to the new currency in their day-to-day role as "family
managers." Surveys have shown that women have great misgivings about the
currency changeover than men do. They are undoubtedly more conscious of the
practical aspects of transition.
European Commission, The Euro and Women, §1 (October 29, 1998) <http://europea.eu.int/euro/
html/page-dossier5.html?dossier=- 177lang=5&page= I &nav=5> (visited July 9, 1999) [hereinafter
The Euro and Women].
84. In 1995, there were approximately 73 million European citizens, or roughly twenty
percent of the population, between the ages of five and twenty years of age. Report of the
Working Group on "Euro-Education," Euro Paper no. 19, 7 (January 29, 1998) <http://europa.eu.
int/euro/html/rubrique0defaut5.html?lang=5&rubrique= 180> [hereinafter Eruo Paper no. 19].
85. Id. at 3.
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spread information they receive to family and friends. Echoing this
observation about the role of young people, the Economic and Social
Committee concluded that ". children have a natural ability to learn,
and they will be the best 'ambassadors' for the single currency. '"86
Indeed, it is likely that these young "ambassadors" will most thoroughly
internalize the values and ideals underpinning a single currency.
Finally, the information campaign has been designed around three
key dates: 1) May 2-3, 1998, when the Council approved eleven Mem-
ber States for participation in stage three of the EMU process; 2) January
1, 1999, when stage three began; and January 1, 2002, when actual euro
notes and coins will be introduced throughout the euro-zone. 87  The
Commission noted that the information campaign would greatly inten-
sify after January 1, 1999:
The transitional period from 1999 to 2001 should be used to shift the
information effort to a higher gear at a time when the public and
everyone involved in economic activity, in particular businesses, will
be showing a great deal of interest in the euro, and will be highly
receptive as a result of the institutional environment. A second wave
of major coverage should be planned for 2001, just before euro notes
and coins are actually introduced and national currencies
withdrawn. 88
In light of this strategy, which carries a large price-tag,8 9 it is likely that
the public's awareness of the nature and implications of the euro
changeover will continue to grow during the transitional period.9° It is
now necessary to analyze the rhetoric and symbolism that has been
employed throughout the course of the information campaign. This
analysis reveals the values, ideals and objectives embedded in the EU's
information and consciousness-raising strategies, and illustrates the
potential social and psychological implications of the euro.
V. RHETORIC AND SYMBOLISM
At times, politicians have stressed the need for a single currency in
86. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 21, at 29.
87. See Information Strategy supra note 72, at 17.
88. Id.
89. In a February 1998 communication to the Council and to the Parliament, the Commission
expressed the desire to set aside 100 million euros for the information campaign between 1999
and 2001. For a more detailed discussion of the EU's budget with respect to the information
campaign, see Partners: Parliament, the Commission and the Member States Together Explain
the Euro to Europe's Citizens, INIEURo, no. 9, 7 (1998) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/htmVrubrique-
defaut5.html?rubrique=101&lang=5>.
90. Judging from the results of a Eurobarometer poll, awareness about the euro has been
steadily increasing. Between 1997 and 1998, the percentage of Europeans who considered
themselves well informed about the euro increased from 36 to 45 percent. See id.
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apocalyptic terms. Before the single currency became an inevitability,
former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, once warned that "the crea-
tion of a common currency in Europe was a matter of war or peace, an
incontrovertible step in the Continent's unification process that meant
vast dangers if it failed."9' Mr. Kohl seemed to suggest that the implica-
tions of a single currency, such as economic cooperation and the possi-
bility of a European identity, would mitigate some of the factors
responsible for World Wars I and II.
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, however, such extreme
rhetoric has generally been replaced by attempts to place the euro in its
proper historical perspective. Although the anticipated economic bene-
fits of EMU are commonly emphasized, the euro is often portrayed as a
step toward deeper integration and the realization of a European identity.
As Jacques Santer, the President of the Commission, noted:
[T]he euro is a powerful factor in forging a European identity. Coun-
tries which share a common currency are countries ready to unite
their destinies as part of an integrated community. The euro will
bring citizens closer together and will provide a physical manifesta-
tion of the growing rapprochement between European citizens which
has been taking place for the past forty years or more.92
This type of rhetoric, which is becoming more common among EU offi-
cials and national leaders, lies close to the heart of the information
campaign.
The Commission's report recommending the Member States
deemed to have qualified for stage three further demonstrates the rheto-
ric that forms a large part of the information campaign: "By creating the
single currency, Europe will be offering its citizens, its children and its
partners in the wider world a more concrete symbol of the common
destiny it has freely chosen: that of building a community based on
peace and prosperity. '93 This rhetoric plainly illustrates the suprana-
tional overtones that characterize the information campaign. For exam-
ple, references to "Europe" and "its citizens" have replaced references to
"Member States" and their nationals, thereby reinforcing the existence
of an overarching political order and civil society. Furthermore, the ref-
erence to a "common destiny" implies shared values and ideals, such as
peace, economic prosperity and democracy for a unified Europe. Such
shared values and ideals potentially serve as the basis for a common
European identity despite differences in culture and ethnicity among
91. John Vinocur, Election Lesson: Germany Without Pain, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 25,
1998) <http://www.iht.com/IHT/JV/98/bj092598.html>.
92. Jacques Santer, The Euro, Instrumental in Forging a European Identity, INFUERO, no. 8, 8
(May 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/rubrique-defaut5.htmlrubrique= 101 &lang=5>.
93. Commission Report on Progress, supra note 47.
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Europeans. This analysis suggests that the information campaign is not
only promoting awareness and acceptance of the euro, but also fostering
a supranational identity.
The Commission's report also advanced the economic rationale for
a single currency. It portrayed the euro as a guarantor of economic pros-
perity and stability:
The introduction of the euro confirms the advent of a genuine culture
of stability in Europe that is essential to the establishment of a stable,
sound and efficiently managed economic framework. It is also a
response to globalisation and current developments in the world
economy. While the euro will not, on its own, enable the scourge of
unemployment to be swept away, without the euro the priority
assigned to jobs would be deprived of a key instrument.E94' Eco-
nomc and monetary union will revitalise the European economy and
the single market, foster investment, boost business competitiveness,
benefit the consumers and savers, and make life easier for citizens
where both work and travel are concemed. 95
As this excerpt illustrates, even the economic rationale for the euro con-
tains supranational overtones that serve to reinforce a common identity.
For instance, the Commission expects all of Europe and its citizens to
reap the anticipated economic benefits of a single currency. Further-
more, EMU is portrayed as a collective response on behalf of the Mem-
ber States to common economic concerns such as inflation, rampant
unemployment, and a rapidly changing world economy.
The euro also is expected to improve Europe's status in the global
economy:
In adopting the euro, the peoples of Europe have decided to occupy a
place on the international scene that is commensurate with their his-
tory and their economic and commercial strength. In so doing, they
are demonstrating their unity to the rest of the world and are asserting
their presence in the monetary sphere.96
These assertions presuppose the existence of unity, as well as of a com-
mon history and future among European citizens. Furthermore, the
quote reveals another avenue for fostering a common identity. More
precisely, the euro is portrayed as vital for Europe's ability to compete
with common external rivals, such as the United States and Japan.
On a different note, the symbolism inherent in the nature and
design of euro notes and coins promotes its own set of values and ideals.
The name of the single currency, in itself, deserves some attention.
94. EMU and the single currency are often regarded as necessary preconditions for an
economic climate conducive to creating jobs.
95. Commission Report on Progress, supra note 47.
96. Id.
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Originally, "ECU" (European Currency Unit) was the proposed name of
the single currency. Pursuant to various recommendations, "euro"
replaced "ECU" since the original name was considered to be a "generic
term.97  This new name, connoting the currency of Europe, plainly
serves as a powerful supranational symbol. 98
During the next three years, Member States within the euro-zone
will produce some 12 billion euro notes and 76 billion euro coins, total-
ing approximately 70 billion euros.99 Much thought was given to the
design of these new notes and coins which will soon be circulating as
legal tender from Helsinki to Lisbon. In June 1997, the European Coun-
cil decided that each euro coin will have a common European face on
one side and a national motif of the Member State's own choice on the
other. The decision to allow national motifs on the coins represented a
compromise between emphasizing Europe and retaining some link with
the past.' 00 One and two euro coins will depict a Europe without
national borders, a symbol which is meant to foreshadow the future of
the EU.1° l On the other hand, euro notes will depict seven architectural
styles that prevailed during different periods of European history. These
architectural periods, which were generally shared by the Member
States, include Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Rococo,
the age of iron and glass, and the 20th century. Designs of windows and
gateways, which are meant to symbolize the spirit of openness and coop-
eration in the EU, will be featured on the face of the new notes, whereas
bridges, which are meant to symbolize communication, will be featured
on the reverse. 0 2
The ECB's recent decision to rule out the possibility of national
symbols appearing on euro notes illustrates the politics of euro-symbol-
ism. Although national symbols may appear on coins, the ECB's sur-
prise decision overrode the wishes of certain Member States to retain a
space for these symbols on euro notes. The ECB's ruling sparked pro-
test in the United Kingdom because the Queen's head may no longer
97. See Council Regulation on the Introduction of the Euro, 9255/97 (July 1, 1997).
98. It is interesting to note that the symbol for the euro (in the sense that the dollar sign, $, is
the symbol of the U.S. dollar) is a Greek epsilon, harking back to the origins of European
civilization, crossed by two parallel lines, representing stability. Epsilon, the Greek letter "E" is
also the first letter of Europe. See Coins, Notes and Sign (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://europa.
eu.int/euro/html/rubrique-defaut5.html?lang=5&rubrique= 100>.
99. The coins will be minted in the following denominations: 2 and 1 euros, then 50, 20, 10,
5, 2, and I euro cents. The notes will be printed in the following denominations: 500, 200, 100,
50, 20, 10, and 5 euros. See id.
100. Although national motifs are allowed to appear on euro coins, they will not be allowed to
appear on euro notes. See id.
101. See id.
102. Barry James, A Few Weighty Facts About the New Currency, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (May
2, 1998) <http://www.iht.com/IHT/BJ/98/bj050298b.html>.
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appear on euro notes in the event that country adopts the euro. British
Opposition leader, William Hague, swiftly complained, calling the deci-
sion a warning signal. Hague's rhetoric shows the power and political
importance of national symbols: "[The Queen's head on the euro note
is...] a symbol of our ability to run our own affairs in this country, it's a
symbol of our ability to set our own taxes, to set our own interest rates,
to govern our own country."'' 0 3 Such comments illustrate the perceived
threat that the euro poses to both national identity and national sover-
eignty. In an attempt to justify the ECB's decision, one EU official
argued, "The decision by the European Central Bank is a trade-off
between the symbolism of national features on the notes and the conven-
ience for the public of having uniform banknotes which are readily
recognised without confusion anywhere in Europe."' 1 4 This justifica-
tion, perhaps strategically, portrayed the decision as a "trade-off'
between national symbolism and convenience, rather than national and
supranational symbolism.
Others have criticized the absence of national symbols on euro
notes from a different standpoint. The Associazione Torino Finanza
argued that the euro notes are too cold and anonymous and, therefore,
will be unable to inspire and capture the imagination of European citi-
zens. Indeed the architectural designs on the notes do not even represent
actual structures.0 5 In order to truly foster a European identity, the
Associazione suggested that there should be a return to real monuments
and people, thereby enabling citizens to openly discover the history and
culture of the different nations within the EU. 106 The Associazione rec-
ommended several structures and people that could be emblematic of
Europe, namely the Eiffel Tower, the Coliseum, the Alhambra and the
Brandenburg Gate or the faces of Leonardo da Vinci, Goethe, Vasco de
Gama, or Vincent Van Gogh."0 7 Although a decision to include national
symbols on the notes could invite national or cultural chauvinism, the
Associazione stressed that countries have demonstrated a capacity for
appreciating a varied and integrated European heritage, citing a bill
presented to the Italian Parliament which requested that July 14 (Bastille
103. Greg Wood, Special Report: Off With the Queen's Head, BBc NEws (Sept. 22, 1998)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sp.. .e-currency/newsid177000/177749.stm>.
104. Id.
105. See Jean-Michel Servet et al., Summary of Experts' Reports Compiled for the Euro
Working Group/European Commission - DG XXIV on Psycho-sociological Aspects of the
Changeover to the Euro, §4.2 (1999) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/html/page-dossier5.html?dossier=
254&lang=5&page=l&nave=5> [hereinafter Report on Psycho-sociological Aspects of the
Changeover].
106. See id.
107. See id.
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Day) be declared the day of United Europe. 108 In light of such criticism,
it seems that the inclusion of certain national symbols would foster,
rather than jeopardize, a European identity and consciousness.
It is now necessary to examine existing attitudes and opinions
among citizens of the European Union to reveal the current mindset
towards the euro, and illustrate the impact that the impending change-
over has already had on European citizens.
VI. ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS
According to a recent cross-Europe poll, fifty-three percent of
Europeans are in favor of the euro.'0 9 However, such views tend to vary
between social groups. Men generally seem to be more in favor of the
euro than women. The results of a Eurobarometer poll show that
approximately forty-six percent of European women supported the sin-
gle currency (compared to fifty-seven percent of men), while forty per-
cent were against it (compared to thirty-three percent of men) and
fourteen percent did not know (compared to ten percent of men). "O Fur-
thermore, most young people seem to be in favor of the euro. The
results of another recent poll show that young people rank the euro sec-
ond (behind new opportunities for traveling and working abroad) in
terms of what they think the EU has contributed to their lives."' Atti-
tudes and opinions regarding the single currency, however, tend to vary
widely from country to country and even between different regions of
the same country.
It seems that most Germans will deeply regret the loss of their pow-
erful deutschmark. Due to memories of wild inflation during the inter-
war period, Germans are particularly preoccupied with the maintenance
of a strong, stable currency." 2 Many observers have noted the powerful
psychological significance of the mark, one of the only national rallying
points in post-war Germany.' ' Despite this attachment to the mark,
Germans have opted in favor of the euro. One German official noted,
"It seems that Germans now identify with the idea of a unified Europe
just as strongly as they used to identify with a strong mark.""' 4 Indeed,
some argue that during the post-war period, Germany has based its very
108. See id.
109. See id. at §3.1.
110. See The Euro and Women, supra note 83, at 5.
111. See Euro Paper no. 19, supra note 84, at 7.
112. See James, supra note 21.
113. See Doris E. Grimm. Comment: Some Psychological Aspects of EMU, 4 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 487-88 (1998).
114. Id at 489.
[Vol. 54:97
TOWARDS A SUPRANATIONAL IDENTITY?
identity on the idea of European integration." 15 On a related note, some
German leaders have manifested a strong interest in permanently putting
the fear of nationalism to rest. This partly explains Germany's instru-
mental role in advancing the EMU process, however, for many Germans
support the euro for economic reasons. More precisely, the German
public is highly aware of the interdependence of European economies. 16
Accordingly, Germans view EMU as a means to ensure that Germany
has a strong, stable currency in the years to come. This notion is con-
firmed by the results of recent local elections, where politicians who ran
on euro-skeptical platforms failed miserably. 1" 7 It is interesting to note
that former East Germans have their own reasons for supporting the
euro. Specifically, East Germans sense that a more integrated Europe
will mean less power and influence for their western counterparts. 1 8
French attitudes toward the single currency are somewhat different.
According to a recent French opinion poll, approximately fifty-seven
percent support the euro.' Like the Germans, the French have tradi-
tionally been preoccupied with the maintenance of a stable currency. As
one commentator noted:
The French, for example, have a long tradition of sometimes being
very psychologically "fixed" on even extreme degrees of "monetary
stability." Their long-standing, almost metaphysical, love affair with
gold as the ultimate coinage of hard currency is well documented.
Barry Eichengreen and others have argued that the excessive insis-
tence of the French on "monetary stability" in the 1920s was one of
the deeper causes of the worldwide depression starting in 1929. Psy-
chologically, the French always wanted the franc to be a strong franc,
for the franc to be one of the hardest currencies in the world. This is
precisely why they found exchange rate depreciations, particularly
against the deutschmark, so humiliating. 121
These observations suggest that France's participation in stage three is
an extension of its traditional psychological preoccupation with mone-
tary stability. By adopting the euro, France will likely acquire one of the
"hardest currencies in the world."' 21 However, France also will lose
certain key sovereign functions, for it will no longer have the power to
govern its monetary policy. Nonetheless, the French are generally in
115. See Barry James, Euro Skepticism Aside, Germans Stake Identity on European
Integration, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Dec, 9, 1997) <http://www.iht.comIIHT/BJ/97/bj120997a.
html>.
116. See Grimm, supra note 113, at 489.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 490.
119. James, supra note 19.
120. Grimm, supra note 113, at 488.
121. Id.
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favor of the euro as many perceive a strong euro as the equivalent of a
strong franc.'22 This notion suggests that the French have, to some
extent, internalized or "nationalized" the euro and, perhaps, some of the
values and ideals that the single currency represents.
Italy and Spain share much in common with France regarding cur-
rency depreciation. The economies of all three countries, but particu-
larly those of Italy and Spain, have suffered greatly as a result of
exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, Italy and Spain made signifi-
cant economic sacrifices 2 3 in order to meet the convergence criteria for
stage three of EMU. One observer explained the psychological reasons
for making these sacrifices:
The people of Italy and Spain always saw in exchange rate deprecia-
tion the principal constraint which blocked them from achieving the
kind of living standard they saw their northern European neighbors
enjoying. Therefore, getting rid of exchange rate depreciation is now
perceived by large parts of the southern European public as a kind of
liberation, a kind of long-deserved chance to finally move on to a
better and safer neighborhood.' 24
Considering these observations, it is not surprising that close to 80 per-
cent of all Italians approve of the euro.' 25 Like the French, the Italians
and the Spanish seem comfortable surrendering their sovereignty, as
well as a potent symbol of their national identity, in exchange for mone-
tary stability and a strong, stable currency.
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has opted out of stage
three in favor of maintaining control over its monetary policy. Unlike
France, Italy, and Spain, the United Kingdom has enjoyed the benefits of
a stronger currency that has been relatively protected from drastic
exchange rate fluctuations. Accordingly, the United Kingdom has had
relatively fewer economic incentives to adopt the euro. As a result, the
British are, for the most part, intensely skeptical about adopting the sin-
gle currency. The extent and nature of British opposition to the euro
was illustrated by demonstrators at the March 1998 meeting of European
finance ministers and central bank leaders held in York, England. The
EU officials "were met with jeers and boos," not to mention eggs that
were being hurled by demonstrators.'2 6 As Gordon Brown, the British
chancellor of the Exchequer, walked by protesters, they hissed "trai-
122. See id.
123. For a more detailed discussion of the sacrifices, see Part II of this study.
124. Grimm, supra note 113, at 487-88.
125. See Report on Psycho-sociological Aspects of the Changeover, supra note 105, at §3.1.
126. Barry James, EU is Set to Clear /I to Start the Euro, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Mar. 24, 1998)
<http://www.iht.com/IHT/BJ/98/bjO32498.html>.
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tor." 127 Furthermore, as Theo Waigel, the German finance minister,
passed, protesters chanted, "Eins, zwei, drei, vier, we don't want your
euro here."' 28 This protest suggests that some British citizens view
EMU as a "foreign" ploy aimed at eroding national sovereignty.,2 9 It
seems, therefore, that many British citizens reject the notion that the
strength of their economy and national currency rests on the viability of
the European economy as a whole.
VII. MITIGATING FACTORS
There are several factors that may serve to mitigate the social and
psychological impact of the euro. Significantly, the prospect of a "dem-
ocratic deficit" with regard to EMU may greatly limit the euro's poten-
tial for fostering a supranational identity among citizens of the EU.13°
Complaints of a democratic deficit have emanated from those, predomi-
nantly in the media and the academy, who believe that the decision to
enter full EMU was made without the assent or involvement of the gen-
eral public. These complaints are supported by the fact that Parliament,
the body which is most accountable to the people, has played a fairly
negligible role in the creation of EMU and the transition to stage
three. 1 ' The independence and limited accountability of the ECB and
the ESCB further supports the argument of a democratic deficit with
regard to the monetary union. On this basis, EMU and the euro are
critized as being the brainchild of a small number of politicians and
officials who have acted pursuant to their own vision of Europe, rather
than the will of the general public. If these criticisms accurately reflect
the views of the common citizen, it is unlikely that the nationals of the
Member States participating in stage three will fully embrace the rheto-
ric and symbolism surrounding the euro. Hence, the purported demo-
cratic deficit could greatly limit the psychological effect of the euro as
some citizens may reject the values and ideals embedded in the concept
of a single European currency.
Despite the efforts of the information campaign, many citizens may
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The comments of one British protester, a former World War I veteran, supports this
notion. In his view, the EMU process, which he perceives as a German-led conspiracy, is the
equivalent of "giving away the country." He added, "Hitler must be laughing in his grave."
These comments are partly based on the fact that Germany has earnestly led the way during the
integration process which has culminated in EMU and the single currency. Id.
130. This discussion does not seek to evaluate the arguments underpinning the purported
democratic deficit. Rather, it intends to explain the possible implications of such a deficit. For a
detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the democratic deficit, see Goebel, supra note 18, at
292.
131. See id.
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still be unable or ill-prepared to comprehend, let alone internalize, the
implications of the single currency when considering how quickly EMU
has been implemented. Indeed, the EMU process, which will soon be
fully implemented, began less than a decade ago. Yet, even assuming
many citizens will not fully internalize the implications of the single
currency in light of the rate at which the euro has been introduced, it is
likely that future generations will more thoroughly internalize these
implications.
Additionally, the prospects of a "two-tier" or "two-speed" Europe
also would limit the euro's potential for fostering a supranational iden-
tity. Because four Member States either have not qualified for or have
opted-out of stage three, some commentators fear that this two-tier
regime will persist. Consequently, millions of citizens of the EU may
not directly experience the full reality of the single currency. 32 Thus,
the meaning and symbolism of the euro could be undermined for all.
Fortunately, the non-participating Member States are ultimately
expected to join stage three.13 3
The growth of non-cash users may also mitigate the potential psy-
chological effect of the euro. Due to the proliferation and growing
acceptance of credit, debit, and stored-value cards, the role of cash is
dwindling in the lives of ordinary citizens. 134 As a result, the psycholog-
ical effect of the presence of actual euro notes and coins, as well as the
absence of national currencies, may be reduced. Yet, notwithstanding
the widespread use of credit, debit, and stored-value cards, the common
citizen will doubtless be forced to resort to cash in certain instances.
Furthermore, although millions of cash cards and electronic billfolds are
already in existence, they generally have been valid only in the country
of issue thus far.'35 As one observer noted, "Once countries are sharing
a single currency, these cards should be able to work anywhere."'' 36
Therefore, even assuming that cash cards will substantially replace the
use of cash, the changeover to the single currency will nonetheless be
felt as citizens are enabled to use such cards anywhere in the euro-zone.
Of the factors that may serve to limit the psychological impact of
the euro, the potential failure of EMU and the single currency in eco-
nomic terms is perhaps the most significant. Although EMU has been
widely forecasted to be an economic success for the participating Mem-
132. This is not to mention the adverse political and economic consequences that would likely
result from a two-tier Europe. See, e.g., id. at 275, 320.
133. See id. at 275.
134. See James, supra note 68.
135. Cash cards and electronic billfolds should not be confused with ATM cards, which
generally have been valid across borders.
136. See James, supra note 68.
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ber States, some commentators are skeptical of the euro's economic ben-
efits. In light of myriad uncertainties, including the prospect of a
looming global recession, only time will gauge the economic success of
the single currency. However, it is clear that public acceptance of the
single currency, and perhaps the European integration process as a
whole, hinges on the economic success of the euro. 137 Likewise, this
success is crucial to the euro's potential for reshaping national identity
and fostering a European identity.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the changes initi-
ated by the commencement of stage three will transcend the realm of
economic and monetary policy. Indeed, the single currency could serve
as a powerful catalyst for deeper European integration. This is not all,
however, for the euro also has the unique potential to fundamentally
transform the way the citizens of the EU view themselves and each
other. Due to the unprecedented nature of the euro changeover, the type
of transformation is unknown and difficult to measure. Yet one thing is
certain: the future of Europe rests on the outcome. As Jacques Reuff
stated as early as 1950, "'L'Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se
fera'-either it will happen that Europe will construct itself through its
currency, or it just wont happen."' 138
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